This paper explores the variation of pricing inefficiency of the stock and index futures with time. The theoretical 'no arbitrage'/ 'cost of carry' price of futures contracts is compared with their actual prices for the period January 1, 2002 to November 24, 2004. The comparison has been made only for the near month futures to ensure good liquidity. In an efficient market, these two prices cannot differ because such a difference provides a risk-less arbitrage opportunity to market players. However, many instances of the difference between the two prices (mispricing) exceeding the transaction cost in the NIFTY index and stock futures are found for operators like financial institutions and members of derivatives exchange. This provides a clear arbitrage opportunity to these players. On an average, NSE members could have made arbitrage profits of 0.34 per cent after accounting for transaction costs on more than 37 per cent of trading days. Financial institutions could have made average arbitrage profits of 0.38 per cent on more than 12 per cent of trading days. The NIFTY index futures are persistently underpriced plausibly due to restrictions on short selling and the hedging activity of investors and fund managers. Most of the high-volume stock futures, on the other hand, are generally overpriced. The overpricing of stock futures points towards the speculative activity in the cash market in these scrips. These findings are generally in line with those in the other markets of the world where such inefficiencies and underpricing in stock index futures are also observed. However, the findings on stock futures are unique to this study because stock futures, being more recent entrants to the global derivatives market, have not been adequately researched.
P rices of futures contracts are expected to closely follow the prices of their underlying security. A mismatch between the two gives rise to riskless arbitrage opportunities to the market players and, therefore, is not sustainable. According to the 'no arbitrage' argument, the futures price should equal the price of the underlying plus the cost of carrying forward for a security that provides no income. The futures price for a common share that provides a known cash dividend income before expiry is determined by the following equation:
F = (S-D) e r(T-t)
(1) where F price of a futures contract expiring at time T S price of the underlying security (common share) at time t D present value (at time t) of a known dividend payable between time t and T on the underlying security t time of pricing of futures contract T expiration time of futures contract r annualized continuously compounded rate of return on a risk-free security for the maturity period (T-t years) representing the cost of carrying forward for a security. If the futures price is less than the right-hand side of Equation (1), then buying a futures contract and selling the underlying asset would provide a risk-free arbitrage opportunity because F converges to S at time T. If the futures price is more than the right-hand side of Equation (1), then selling a futures contract and buying the underlying asset would provide a similar risk-free arbitrage opportunity. Since such opportunities cannot sustain in a frictionless efficient market, the futures price should always follow Equation (1).
For index futures, Equation (1) gets modified to:
F = (I-D) e r(T-t)
(2) where the additional notations used are the following: I level of the underlying index at time t D present value (at time t) of a known stream of dividends payable between time t and T (expressed in the units of index points) on the index portfolio of shares. Here, the arbitrage can be done between the futures contract and the portfolio of common shares formed by the constituent shares of the index taken in the same proportion as that in the index.
In an efficient market, such risk-free arbitrage opportunities cannot sustain. Therefore, the futures prices are expected to follow Equations (1) and (2). This paper explores the effect of time on the pricing efficiency of stock and index futures in India. It compares the expected price under the 'no arbitrage' proposition with the actual price of futures contracts to identify the existence of mispricing and investigates whether mispricing has changed over the last three years of market operations. It also studies the effects of 'day of the week' and 'days to expiry' on mispricing.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Researchers have investigated mispricing of futures contracts with respect to the spot price of their underlying in the context of Equations (1) and (2). Mispricing has been observed in index futures, at times with specific patterns. Individual stock futures have not been researched adequately because of their more recent introduction to the financial markets globally. Modest and Sundaresan (1983) , Figlewski (1984) , MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) , and Yadav and Pope (1994) found significant inconsistencies between the spot prices and the futures prices for stock indexes which can be exploited by the arbitrageurs. Yadav and Pope (1994) found that the direction of mispricing in both the near and the far contracts of FTSE 100 futures was the same. They also reported that the magnitude of mispricing was greater for the contracts with longer times to maturity. An autocorrelated persistent mispricing between the spot and the futures prices was observed by MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) , Neal (1990) , Chung (1991) , and other researchers in the US; Yadav and Pope (1994) and Garrett and Taylor (2001) in the UK; Bowers and Twite (1985) , Heaney (1995) and Brailsford and Hodgson (1997) in Australia; Brenner, Subrahmanyam and Uno (1989) in Japan; Lai and Marshall (2002) in Hong Kong; Puttonen (1993a and b) in Finland, and Vipul (2004) in India. One explanation of this behaviour is the lack of maturity of the arbitrage sector which reacts with a delay. The other possibility is non-synchronous trading in the stock and futures markets. However, the research based on the high frequency data, which controls the non-synchronous error, still shows numerous instances of mispricing and arbitrage opportunities (MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988; Brennan and Schwartz, 1990; Hodgson, Kendig and Tahir, 1993; Yadav and Pope, 1994) . Chung (1991); Klemkosky and Lee (1991), Miller, Muthuswamy, and Whaley (1994) , Butterworth and Holmes (2000) , and Lai and Marshall (2002) did not find arbitrage opportunities significant enough to be economically exploitable. Garrett and Taylor (2001) found that the intraday and interday mispricing in FTSE 100 are mean reverting and, therefore, predictable. Brailsford and Hodgson (1997) confirmed that index futures are generally underpriced in the Australian market with the mispricing being significantly lower on Fridays which is significantly explained by time to expiry (as also observed by Yadav and Pope (1994) in the UK for FTSE 100) and volatility. They also found unexpected trading volume and volatility of futures prices to have a positive impact on mispricing.
Arbitrage involves costs like brokerage and opportunity cost of margin deposits. It also entails risks of uncertainty in execution, interest rates, and dividend payments. These costs and risks introduce inefficiency in the arbitrage process. Restrictions on short selling add to the cost of arbitraging when a long position in the futures and short position in the underlying is required. It introduces friction in the activities required for this type of arbitraging and generally causes underpricing of the index futures. Restrictions on short selling are present in most of the stock markets in one form or the other. The effects of these restrictions are documented in a number of studies of index futures prices. Kempf (1998) found that the restrictions on short selling in German market caused mispricing in German DAX Index futures which was supported theoretically by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) . Puttonen (1993a) found that the short selling restrictions caused such mispricing in Finnish FOX market. Jiang, Fung and Cheng (2001) concluded that the lifting of short selling restrictions at the stock exchange of Hong Kong led to a more efficient pricing of Hang Seng Index futures. Some researchers put forward a counter argument that the restrictions on short selling do not cause mispricing since institutions can use their existing inventory for selling purpose. Neal (1996) supported it in his study of S&P 500 Index and futures prices. Chan (1992) also supported it for marginal arbitrageurs by showing that the lead-lag relation between the futures and the spot prices did not get affected by the direction of the movement of prices in the market. Since short selling is completely prohibited in the Indian stock (cash) markets, it is an important aspect to study. However, one can still short-sell by informally borrowing the required stock, selling it, and returning it to the lender later when the position is unwound.
FUTURES CONTRACTS IN INDIA
Futures contracts were introduced in the Indian market in June 2000 when both the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), started trading in index futures. Even earlier, the Indian stock market was accustomed to carry forward facilities (Badla system) which had some characteristics of futures contracts. While NSE started with trading of futures on S&P CNX NIFTY Index (NIFTY), BSE introduced futures on Sensex. The average daily volumes of trading in options and futures picked up from Rs. 2 crores in June, 2000 to cross Rs. 8,790 crores by November, 2004 at NSE. Stock futures were introduced in November, 2001 both by NSE and BSE on 41 equity shares. NSE accounts for more than 97 per cent of the total turnover in the index and stockbased derivative products in India. Stock futures are more recent entrants to the derivatives market globally and not much research has been done on them. In fact, the Indian derivatives market has been one of the pioneers in the area of stock futures. NSE-traded NIFTY futures and six most liquid stock futures are selected for this study. Due to predominance of NSE in derivative trading, time-stamped transaction prices at NSE are used to identify mispricing. The list of futures contracts covered in this study is given in Table 1 . The turnover of the selected individual equity stock futures ranged between 88-319 per cent of their respective turnover in the cash market (combined equity market turnover at NSE and BSE) on November 30, 2004.
Trading on both BSE and NSE has been screen-based for the entire period of the study for both the cash and derivative segments. This allows arbitrageurs the use of computer programs for identifying arbitrage conditions and ensures a quick execution of orders. The index and the stock futures at NSE are traded in monthly series, 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Prices for the near month futures contracts have been used in this study because liquidity in the next and the far month contracts is not satisfactory. However, on the expiration day, the price of the next month contract is taken to obviate the influence of winding down activities on the near month contract. Moreover, the volumes of the next month contract build up sufficiently by the expiration day of the near month contract to make its pricing efficient. Furthermore, the most liquid futures contracts have been selected as explained later. Timestamped price quotations for futures and the underlying contracts provided by NSE are used to obviate nonsynchronous error. Out of the 52 stock futures traded in the Indian market, many are not sufficiently liquid. Since the price efficiency of less liquid stock futures is not reliable, only the most liquid contracts (across the study period) are selected. The criterion for selection is the average rank of the stock futures on January 1, 2002 (about two months after the beginning of trading in stock futures allowed for stabilization of the market) and November 30, 2004. Only those stock futures are selected which have an average rank of 12 or higher. The cut-off limit for these stock futures is decided by the minimum daily turnover of Rs. 16 million (notional value of contracts) on January 1, 2002. Since the turnover has been increasing consistently since then, this criterion ensures that the daily turnover for any of the contracts was never less than Rs. 16 million per day. This translates to more than 100 contracts per day. The list of these stock futures along with their average ranks is given in Table 1 . NIFTY future, which has had a daily turnover of more than any of these stock futures all along, has also been selected. The prices for different trading days for futures and the corresponding underlying are matched within a short time interval to identify the arbitrage opportunities as per Equations (1) and (2).
For testing Equations (1) and (2) . IISL has constructed TRI which is based on NIFTY constituent stocks in the same proportion as in NIFTY but it also includes dividend payments from time to time on these stocks in addition to their price changes. Dividend payouts, as they occur, are indexed on ex-date. Indexed dividends are then assumed to be reinvested in the index to arrive at the TRI according to the following formulae:
Base capitalization of index (Rs.)
TRI = (Previous day TRI + Indexed dividends) x (Current day NIFTY/Previous day NIFTY)
The current day and the previous day values of TRI are taken from TRI series (provided by IISL) and the current day and the previous day values of NIFTY are taken from NIFTY series. Based on these values, the daily indexed dividends are computed. For the period February 1, 2004 -November 24, 2004 , the daily indexed dividends are computed using the market capitalization and dividend data on constituent shares of NIFTY from the PROWESS database. Daily indexed dividends discounted at the appropriate interest rate (r) for the relevant month is the value of D in Equation (2).
Discount rate for the treasury bills is taken as the risk-free rate (r) for the period between the transaction date and the expiration date. Since only the near month futures are studied, interest rates for only one month or less are required at a time. The monthly interest rates on an average changed by 0.04 per cent per annum with the maximum change being 0.66 per cent per annum for May 2003 (Table 2 ). This is too small a difference to significantly affect the mispricing computations. Based on this consideration, a single value of the interest rates was taken for a particular month. Any change in interest rates across the calendar months is specifically accounted for. Yield-to-maturity (YTM) for treasury bills with a residual maturity of 15-91 days is taken from the RBI weekly statistical supplements for the weeks ending between 4th to 18th days of each month. Depending on how many weeks ended between 4th to 18th of the month, an average yield of two to three weeks' data are taken. Both the maximum and the minimum values of the reported yield are used for this averaging. Since these yields are based on the transactions reported in Subsidiary General Ledger accounts at RBI, Mumbai, which account for nearly 98 per cent of the total transactions in the country, they represent the risk-free interest rate for each month fairly well. The annual yields reported by RBI are based on 364-day year, computed by the treasury method of yield calculation. These yields are converted to an equivalent continuously compounded rate of return for a 365-day year. Values of these riskfree rates of return (r) for different months used in this study are reported in Table 2 .
Equation (1) gives the theoretical price of a stock future (F) according to the 'no arbitrage' argument. We prefer the pricing model for the futures that assumes a known cash income from the security. This model better captures the reality compared to the alternative model that assumes a constant dividend yield. Dividend payments are typically discrete events which, even in case of NIFTY which is constituted of 50 shares, cannot be approximated with a continuous stream in the Indian market. The dividend payments tend to lump together during the second half of the calendar year as most of the companies have their book closing on 31st March. Moreover, since only the near month futures have been studied, it is a fair assumption that the amount of dividend and its ex-date would be known to the market with a priori certainty (about one month prior to the ex-date). If the actual futures price of the stock (F a ) differs significantly from its theoretical value (F), then arbitrage opportunities arise. The extent of arbitrage profits can be judged in percentage terms by per cent mispricing ln(F/F a ). This quantity is computed substituting the values of S (price of stock), D (present value of dividends on the stock), r (risk-free rate for the month), T-t (time period measured in years from the date of futures price till the expiration date of the futures contract). It reflects the amount (in percentage of future price) by which the future is underpriced compared to its theoretical price given by Equation (1). The absolute value of this quantity reflects the opportunity to make a profit. Since arbitrage can be on either side, a highly negative value is as attractive to an arbitrageur as a highly positive value. If the extent of arbitrage profit is large enough to cover the transaction costs, then arbitrageurs would become active in the market. However, if the market is efficient, then the quantum and frequency of such arbitrage opportunities would be small. The net arbitrage profit for an arbitrageur would depend on the specific transaction cost applicable to him. Arbitrage opportunities are analysed for players with different transaction costs. For NIFTY futures, Equation (2) is used to compute per cent underpricing ln(F/F a ).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Any significant mispricing in the futures contracts gives rise to an arbitrage opportunity. However, arbitrageurs can use it only if mispricing exceeds transaction costs. Transaction costs differ for different players. We assume that arbitrage would generally be undertaken by financial institutions or the members of NSE. These are the players who have the best knowledge and infrastructure for such transactions. The transaction costs for setting up a simple arbitrage would involve a round-trip transaction ('purchase and sale' or 'sale and purchase') in the underlying security in the cash market and a long or short position in futures to be squared-up on expiry. For financial institutions, the transaction costs would include twice the brokerage for the cash market (about 0.25% for a medium-sized financial institution for sale or purchase), once the brokerage for a short or long position in futures (about 0.05% of the notional value) and the opportunity loss on margin (0.15% on a typical margin of 25% for maximum one-month lock-in at a riskfree interest of about 7% per annum). Any mispricing of the futures beyond this transaction cost (0.70%) provides an opportunity to a financial institution to earn risk-free profit. For members of the NSE, the brokerage cost is not applicable. But, it would be unreasonable to assume that their transaction costs for the arbitrage is zero. They would also have to do a number of back-office activities which are not free of cost. A better assumption would be that their cost is close to the lowest brokerage they charge their important bulk customers. This price, due to intense competition in the market, is expected to be close to their marginal cost. This is 0.15 per cent for the cash market (either purchase or sale) and 0.05 per cent of the notional value for the futures. The opportunity cost for the initial margin on futures positions is not relevant to them because they can deposit initial margins in the form of term deposit receipts of commercial banks without losing any interest. Therefore, their transaction cost would be 0.35 per cent. For those days when the absolute value of per cent mispricing is more than 0.35 per cent, NSE members would be able to make arbitrage profits and when it is more than 0.70 per cent, both NSE members and financial institutions would be able to make arbitrage profits.
Underpricing as a percentage of futures price for NIFTY futures and six families of stock futures, classified into five groups, based on the magnitude and direction of arbitrage, is given in Table 3 . Arbitrage opportunities are also indicated for five different ranges for all the seven families of futures. These ranges correspond to the transaction costs of NSE members (0.35%) and financial institutions (0.70%). The percentage of those days when an arbitrage profit could be made and the average magnitude of such arbitrage profit for the relevant range are specified for each range.
Significant arbitrage opportunities can be observed both for the members of the exchange and financial institutions. Out of the total 733 trading days analysed, financial institutions had arbitrage opportunities on 12 per cent of the days whereas NSE members had arbitrage opportunities on 37 per cent of the days. Both NIFTY and stock futures provide arbitrage opportunities to the members of NSE and financial institutions for a large number of trading days which are of a comparable order across various futures. However, there is a significant asymmetry with majority of arbitrage opportunities in NIFTY futures accounted by the underpricing of futures. This finding is consistent with the findings of Kempf (1998) , Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) , Puttonen (1993a) , and Jiang, Fung and Cheng (2001) who, in the context of different markets, found that the short selling restrictions generally lead to the underpricing of index futures. The ACC, RIL, TELCO, and TISCO families of futures do not follow this pattern and are mostly overpriced. INFOSYS and SATYAM futures provide arbitrage opportunity both due to underpricing and overpricing. On an average, NSE members could have made arbitrage profits of 0.34 per cent after transaction costs on more than 37 per cent of trading days for different families of futures. Financial institutions could have made average arbitrage profits of 0.38 per cent on more than 12 per cent of trading days. These observations point towards numerous instances of futures mispricing in the Indian market. Overall, there is a trend towards the overpricing of stock futures and the underpricing of NIFTY futures but individual futures have their own pattern. This is due to the specific supply and demand conditions in the cash market. In case of NIFTY futures, underpricing is substantial and is partially explainable by the restriction on short selling of underlying stocks which makes it very difficult to short sell the complete portfolio of NIFTY stocks in the exact proportion as that in the index. In case of individual stocks, it appears that the market has been over-optimistic and inefficient. The downward drag on the stock futures due to restrictions on short selling does not show due to this over-optimism.
We now examine the mispricing in the context of its historical pattern, time to expiry, and weekdays. Average underpricing is used as the indicator of the effect of various time-related conditions. If the average underpricing for a particular time condition shows a specific pattern, then suitable conclusions are drawn about it. Patterns of average mispricing can be analysed using suitable parametric statistical tests if the series of average underpricing is normally distributed with equal variance for different time periods. Parametric tests would be preferable due to their higher power. To test the basic requirement of normal distribution, the underpricing series of NIFTY futures and six families of stock futures are separately subjected to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The results of these tests are reported in Table 4 . Each future is analysed for 733 days of underpricing. While mean underpricing is a small negative (for five types of futures) or positive (for two types of futures) number, standard deviation is fairly large. However, for all the underpricing series, the p-value is less than 5 per cent which implies that the null hypothesis (that the distributions for these underpricing values are normal) cannot be accepted at 5 per cent level of significance.
With non-normal underpricing series, parametric tests would give misleading results. Therefore, suitable non-parametric tests are applied to analyse the average underpricing for different time conditions. For selecting these tests, the applicability of the basic assumptions and the power of the tests are the primary considerations. The Kruskal-Wallis test (more than two samples) and the Mann-Whitney test (two samples) are used for the purpose depending on the context.
Historical Pattern
Index futures were introduced in the Indian market on June 12, 2000 and the stock futures on November 9, 2001. About two months (November and December 2001) were allowed for stabilization of the market after the introduction of stock futures and mispricing was studied for a 35-month period. The underpricing of futures was first divided into six-month periods (January-June and JulyDecember) for each year -the last period (July-November, 2004) being only of five months. There were six different periods. To study the behaviour of underpricing across these periods, we compared the average underpricing for each of these periods. The underpricing values for the total period (all the six-month periods) available for a particular family of futures were ranked in the ascending order. The average rank, average underpricing, and number of observations for each of the six-month periods are reported in Table 5 . The average of all these quantities for the total period is given in the last column for comparison. The Kruskal-Wallis H test is applied on all the six-month periods for each family of futures separately to test the null hypothesis that the mean underpricing is the same in all the six-month periods. The average rank in each of the six-month periods will tend to be equal (equal to the average rank for all the six-month periods taken together as given in the last column) if the average underpricing does not change across the six-month periods. The p values for the KruskalWallis test are also reported in Table 5 . The null hypothesis is rejected for all the futures even at 0.1 per cent level of significance.
The Kruskal-Wallis test confirms that mispricing has not been the same across different six-month peri- Mann-Whitney U test, when applied to Period 3 as a benchmark with respect to Periods 4, 5, and 6, confirms that the overpricing of all the stock futures (with the exception of NIFTY) for Period 4 is significant whereas underpricing for Periods 5 and 6 is significant only for four and two futures respectively. The detailed results are not reported for brevity. This pattern may be a part of the process of stabilization of the market through cyclical movements; however, it is difficult to read much meaning in this as regards the improvement or otherwise in the efficiency of the market over time.
Time to Expiry
Some researchers have found a relationship between mispricing and the time to expiry of futures. Also there is evidence that the day of expiry has some abnormal activities due to unwinding (Refer to Chow, Yung and Zhang (2003) ; Lien and Yang (2003) ; Stoll and Whaley (1997) ; Antoniou and Holmes (1995) for instance). MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) and Yadav and Pope (1994) found that the availability of arbitrage opportunities increases with the days to expiry (DTE). Vipul (2004) found that DTE have a significant impact on the futures mispricing. In the light of such findings, the effect of weeks to expiry (WTE) and DTE on mispricing is analysed next. Since underpricing is computed only for the 'near' futures contracts, the range of DTE observed is 1-36. The underpricing values for the complete period available for a particular family of futures are classified into five classes based on the remaining WTE values of 0-1 weeks, 1-2 weeks, etc. All the underpricing values for a specific family of futures are then ranked in the ascending order. The average rank, average underpricing, and number of observations for each of the five classes corresponding to different WTE classes are reported in Table 6 . The average of all these quantities for the total period is given in the last column for comparison. The Kruskal-Wallis H test is applied on the five WTE classes for each family of futures separately. The null hypothesis is that the mean underpricing is the same in all the five classes. That is, WTE does not affect mispricing. The average rank in each of the five classes will tend to be equal (equal to the average rank for all the classes taken together as given in the last column) if the average underpricing does not change. The pvalues for the Kruskal-Wallis test are also reported. The null hypothesis is rejected for four families of futures and accepted for INFOSYS, SATYAM and TELCO at 5 per cent level of significance. This confirms that mispricing is not similar across the five WTE-based classes. Now, the classes causing this difference need to be identified. A closer look at the mean ranks indicates a major difference for the classes corresponding to 0-1 and 4-5 WTE. The mean rank of 0-1 class tends to be higher whereas the mean rank of the 4-5 class tends to be lower for most of the families of stock futures. However, the mean rank of 0-1 class for the NIFTY futures is lower and that of 4-5 class is higher. These observations need statistical confirmation which is done for different families of futures in Tables  7 and 8 . For confirming whether the mean mispricing for WTE values in the range 0-1 is significantly higher than that for the other values of WTE (1-4 excluding 4-5), the underpricing values for different families of futures are divided into two classes each: the first class corresponding to WTE values 0-1 and the second class corresponding to WTE values 1-4. The average rank and the number of observations for the two classes are reported in Table 7 . The overall average rank of all these quantities for the total period is given in the last column for comparison. The Mann-Whitney U test is applied on these two classes to test the null hypothesis that the mean underpricing is similar in both these classes. The p values of these tests applied separately for each family of futures confirm that except for INFOSYS, SATYAM, and TELCO family, the mean underpricing for 0-1 WTE class is significantly different from the mean underpricing of other classes at 5 per cent level of significance. It is lower for NIFTY and higher for the other families of futures. This is also consistent with the earlier results of the Kruskal-Wallis test. Similarly, for confirming whether the mean underpricing for WTE values in the range 4-5 is significantly different from the other values of WTE (1-4 excluding 0-1), the Mann-Whitney U test is applied to all the families of futures on two classes corresponding to WTE values of 4-5 and 1-4. All the statistics and test results for these tests are reported in Table 8 . The p values confirm that the mean mispricing for 4-5 WTE class is not significantly different from the mean mispricing of other classes at 5 per cent level of significance. It can, therefore, be reasonably inferred that mispricing does not differ significantly for the WTE values of 4-5 weeks. The earlier observations of lower mean rank can be ascribed to the higher random error associated with smaller samples of observations for this class.
In most of the instances, the NIFTY futures are underpriced and the stock futures are overpriced. For one week prior to expiry, the NIFTY futures tend to be relatively less underpriced and the stock futures relatively less overpriced. The efficiency of pricing improves in both but the average rank moves in the opposite direction. The mispricing pattern for the other periods is not significantly different from each other. The effect on the mispricing of different days within the last week before expiry needs to be further analysed. For this purpose, the mispricing for each of the family of futures is grouped for different DTE ranging between 1-7 days. The mean rank of underpricing values along with the other statistics for the groups corresponding to 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 DTE are reported in Table 9 (DTE values of 5 and 4 correspond to Saturday and Sunday). The KruskalWallis H test is applied on these five groups to test the null hypothesis that the mispricing pattern is similar in all these groups. The p-values of these tests applied separately for each family of futures confirm that the mean mispricing for all the five classes is not significantly different from each other for any futures at 5 per cent level of significance. Therefore, specific days of the last WTE do not appear to have different patterns in mispricing.
Why is the mispricing pattern different during the last week before expiry? The NIFTY futures are less underpriced whereas the stock futures are less overpriced during the last week. Individual days of the last week do not show different mispricing patterns. This behaviour can be understood better if we see it in the light of the general mispricing pattern of Table 3 . The NIFTY futures are generally underpriced. This indicates that the people who are shorting this contract ('shorters') are more than those who want to take a long position. The 'shorters' may be investors and fund managers who hedge their investments or funds. The speculative traders, being the counter party taking a long position, are buying the NIFTY futures at a lower price. The persistent underpricing of the NIFTY futures is also explainable partly by the inability of arbitrageurs to short sell the constituents of NIFTY in the cash market to make an arbitrage profit under the conditions of underpricing of NIFTY futures. When the expiry approaches, the mispricing goes down partially, because squaring-up of short positions by the hedgers creates sufficient demand of long positions in futures in the market. It is a common observation that the open interest position starts winding down about one week prior to the expiry of the futures contract. In case of stock futures, (with the exception of INFOSYS, SATYAM, and TELCO), the opposite phenomenon takes place. During the early weeks, these futures have a high speculative demand (being blue-chip companies; with the exception of INFOSYS, SATYAM, and TELCO due to industry-specific reasons) which is fulfilled by the speculative futures traders who take an opposite (short) position at a higher price. During the last week before the expiry, mispricing goes down due to squaring-up of the positions which leads to relatively lower overpricing of the stock futures.
Weekdays
In the cash (stock) markets, abnormal returns have been observed on certain days of the week (Monday effect in the US and Wednesday and Friday effects in India). Brailsford and Hodgson (1997) family of futures. The financial institutions could have made average arbitrage profits of 0.38 per cent on more than 12 per cent of trading days. The NIFTY futures are persistently underpriced plausibly due to the restrictions on short selling and the hedging activity of investors and fund managers. Most of the high-volume stock futures like the ACC, RIL, SATYAM, TELCO, and TISCO do not follow this pattern and are generally overpriced. The INFOSYS futures are both underpriced and overpriced at times. The overpricing of stock futures points towards the speculative activity in the cash market in these scrips. There does not appear to be a specific pattern in terms of increase or decrease of efficiency in the pricing of futures over the last three years. The mispricing pattern keeps changing over time.
The last week prior to expiry shows a reduction in mispricing for both the NIFTY and the stock futures due to unwinding of positions by the traders. But there is no discernible difference in the mispricing pattern between individual days of the last week. Further, there is no evidence of any difference in mispricing across weekdays either. These results have obvious implications for the arbitrageurs in the Indian futures market. Firstly, there are many sizeable arbitrage opportunities available to the traders who are willing to take a position opposite to the common market demand. Secondly, such opportunities and their magnitude keep changing over time. Thirdly, an arbitrage opportunity is likely to go down in the last week before the expiry. And finally, one cannot expect more such opportunities on a particular day of the week.
